Car Reporting Accidents, Violations

In addition to car’s using network connections to call for assistance, here is a natural consequence — your car may notify police of an accident, in this case a driver leaving a hit-and-run situation. My insurance company offered to add a device to my car that would allow them to increase my rates if they go faster than they think I should.  Some insurance companies will raise your rates if you exceed their limit (70 MPH) even in areas where the legal limit is higher (Colorado, Wyoming, etc. have 75+ posted limits).  A phone company is promoting a device to add into your car to provide similar capabilities (presented for safety and comfort rationale.)

So what are the possibilities?

  • Detect accident situations and have emergency response arrive even if you are unable to act — and as noted above this may also detect hit-and-run accidents.
  • Provide a channel for you to communicate situations like “need roadside assistance” or “report roadside problem”.
  • Monitor car performance characteristics and notify user (shop?) of out-of-spec conditions
  • Using this same “diagnostic port”, taking remote control of car
    • Police action – to stop driver from escaping
    • Ill-intended action, to cause car to lose control

So, in line with the season, your car  is making a list, checking it twice and going to report if you are naughty or nice —

====

One additional article from the WSJ Dec. 10th on the Battle between car manufacturers and smartphone companies for control of the car-network environment.  The corporate view, from Don Butler, Ford Motor’s Director of Connected Vehicles: “We are competing for mind-share inside the vehicle.”  Or as the WSJ says, “Car makers are loath to give up key information and entertainment links… and potentially to earn revenue by selling information and mobile connectivity.”  In short, the folks directing the future of connected vehicles are not focusing on the list of possibilities and considerations above.

 

T&S Magazine September 2015 Contents

cover 1

Volume 34, Number 3, September 2015

4 President’s Message
Coping with Machines
Greg Adamson
Book Reviews
5 Marketing the Moon: The Selling of the Apollo Lunar Mission
7 Alan Turing: The Enigma
10 Editorial
Resistance is Not Futile, nil desperandum
MG Michael and Katina Michael
13 Letter to the Editor
Technology and Change
Kevin Hu
14 Opinion
Privacy Nightmare: When Baby Monitors Go Bad
Katherine Albrecht and Liz Mcintyre
15 From the Editor’s Desk
Robots Don’t Pray
Eugenio Guglielmelli
17 Leading Edge
Unmanned Aircraft: The Rising Risk of Hostile Takeover
Donna A. Dulo
20 Opinion
Automatic Tyranny, Re-Theism, and the Rise of the Reals
Sand Sheff
23 Creating “The Norbert Wiener Media Project”
J. Mitchell Johnson
25 Interview
A Conversation with Lazar Puhalo
88 Last Word
Technological Expeditions and Cognitive Indolence
Christine Perakslis

SPECIAL ISSUE: Norbert Wiener in the 21st Century

33_ Guest Editorial
Philip Hall, Heather A. Love and Shiro Uesugi
35_ Norbert Wiener: Odd Man Ahead
Mary Catherine Bateson
37_ The Next Macy Conference: A New Interdisciplinary Synthesis
Andrew Pickering
39_ Ubiquitous Surveillance and Security
Bruce Schneier
41_ Reintroducing Wiener: Channeling Norbert in the 21st Century
Flo Conway and Jim Siegelman
44_ Securing the Exocortex*
Tamara Bonaci, Jeffrey Herron, Charles Matlack, and Howard Jay Chizeck
52_ Wiener’s Prefiguring of a Cybernetic Design Theory*
Thomas Fischer
60_ Norbert Wiener and the Counter-Tradition to the Dream of Mastery
D. Hill
64_ Down the Rabbit Hole*
Laura Moorhead

Features

74_ Opening Pandora’s 3D Printed Box
Phillip Olla
81_ Application Areas of Additive Manufacturing
N.J.R. Venekamp and H.Th. Le Fever

*Refereed article.

T&S Magazine June 2015 Contents

cover 1

Volume 34, Number 2, June 2015

3 ISTAS 2015 – Dublin
4 President’s Message
Deterministic and Statistical Worlds
Greg Adamson
5 Editorial
Mental Health, Implantables, and Side Effects
Katina Michael
8 Book Reviews
Reality Check: How Science Deniers Threaten Our Future
Stealing Cars: Technology & Society from the Model T to the Gran Torino
13 Leading Edge
“Ich liebe Dich UBER alles in der Welt” (I love you more than anything else in the world)
Sally Applin
Opinion
16 Tools for the Vision Impaired
Molly Hartman
18 Learning from Delusions
Brian Martin
21 Commentary
Nanoelectronics Research Gaps and Recommendations*
Kosmas Galatsis, Paolo Gargini, Toshiro Hiramoto, Dirk Beernaert, Roger DeKeersmaecker, Joachim Pelka, and Lothar Pfitzner
80 Last Word
Father’s Day Algorithms or Malgorithms?
Christine Perakslis

SPECIAL ISSUE—Ethics 2014/ISTAS 2014

31_ Guest Editorial
Keith Miller and Joe Herkert
32_ App Stores for the Brain: Privacy and Security in Brain-Computer Interfaces*
Tamara Bonaci, Ryan Calo, and Howard Jay Chizeck
40_ The Internet Census 2012 Dataset: An Ethical Examination*
David Dittrich, Katherine Carpenter, and Manish Karir
47_ Technology as Moral Proxy: Autonomy and Paternalism by Design*
Jason Millar
56_ Teaching Engineering Ethics: A Phenomenological Approach*
Valorie Troesch
64_ Informed Consent for Deep Brain Stimulation: Increasing Transparency for Psychiatric Neurosurgery Patients*
Andrew Koivuniemi
71_ Robotic Prosthetics: Moving Beyond Technical Performance*
N. Jarrassé, M. Maestrutti, G. Morel, and A. Roby-Brami

*Refereed Articles

 

Toys, Terrorism and Technology

Recent attacks on citizens in all too many countries have raised the question of creating back-doors in encrypted communications technology.  A November 22 NY Times article by Zeynep Tufekci: “The WhatsApp Theory of Terrorism“, does a good job of explaining some of the flaws in the “simplistic” – government mandated back-doors. The short take: bad guys have access to tools that do not need to follow any government regulations, and bad guys who want to hack your systems can use any backdoor that governments do mandate — no win for protection, big loss of protection.

Toys? The Dec. 1 Wall Street Journal covered: “Toy Maker Says Hack Accessed Customer Information“.  While apparently no social security or credit card data was obtained, there is value in having names – birthdates – etc for creating false credentials.  How does this relate to the Terrorist Threat?  — two ways actually:

  1. there are few, if any, systems that hackers won’t target — so a good working assumption is someone will try to ‘crack’ it.
  2. technologists, in particular software developers, need to be aware, consider and incorporate appropriate security requirements into EVERY online system design.

We are entering the era of the Internet of Things (IoT), with many objects now participating in a globally connected environment.  There are no doubt some advantages (at least for marketing spin) with each such object.  There will be real advantages for some objects.  New insight may be discovered though the massive amount of data available  – for example, can we track global warming via the use of IoT connected heating/cooking devices? However, there will be potential abuses of both individual objects (toys above), and aggregations of data.  Software developers and their management need to apply worst case threat-analysis to determine the risks and requirements for EVERY connected object.

Can terrorists, or other bad guys, use toys? Of Course!  There are indications that X-Box and/or Playstations were among the networked devices used to coordinate some of the recent attacks. Any online environment that allows users to share data/objects can be used as a covert communications channel.  Combining steganography and ShutterFly,  Instagram, Minecraft,  or any other site where you can upload or manipulate a shareable image is a channel.  Pretending we can protect them all is a dangerous delusion.

Is your employer considering IoT security?  Is your school teaching about these issues?

 

Auto(mobile) hacking – is it just a myth?

Scientific American ran a “Technofiles” piece  trying to debunk the idea that cars can be hacked.  The online version corrects errors made in their November 2015 issue where the variation of the article overstated the time required, understated the number of potentially ‘at risk’ cars, and mis-stated the proximity required to accomplish the feat.

This has been a topic here before – so I won’t repeat that perspective.  However, I will copy my reply to the article posted on the Scientific American web site, since I think that this effort to dismiss the risk does a poor service to both the public, and to the industry that needs to give serious consideration for how they manage software and communications that can affect the health and safety of consumers.

David, et al, are not getting the message.
Yes, some of the details are wrong in David’s article (I guessed they were without being party to the Wired article) … also wrong is the “Internet” connection required assumption — external communications that can receive certain types of data is all that is required. (OnStar does not use the Internet) and the “premium savings” device advocated by my insurance company (“oh no, our folks assure us it can’t be hacked”) connects to the diagnostic port of the car (i.e. ability to control/test all aspects of operation) and is cell-phone connected to whomever can dial the number.
This is not model specific since all OnStar and after-market components span multiple models and multiple suppliers. This is not internet specific, but truly remote control would require either the cellular or internet connectivity (WiFi and Blue tooth, which are also likely “bells and whistles” are proximity limited.)
This does not require purchasing a car… they do rent cars you know. And to the best of my knowledge no automobile manufacturers have licensed software engineers reviewing and confirming a “can’t be done” — even if they did patch the flaw that the U.S. DoD/DARPA folks exploited for Sixty Minutes. — Until 9/11 no one had hijacked a commercial jet to destroy a major landmark before, so the lack of examples is not a valid argument. We have multiple proofs of concept at this point, that significantly reduces the cost and time required to duplicate this. There are substantial motives, from blackmail to terrorism (a batch of cars, any cars – terrorists don’t need to select, going off the road after a short prior notice from a terrorist organization would get the front page coverage that such folks desire.) The issues here, including additional considerations on privacy, etc. are ongoing discussions in the IEEE Society for the Social Implications of Technology … the worlds largest technical professional society (IEEE)’s forum for such considerations. see http://ieeessit.org/?p=1364 for related postings”

I’m not sure the editors will “get it” … but hopefully our colleagues involved in developing the cars and after-market devices can start implementing some real protections.

A question for a broader audience: “How do cell phone or internet based services (such as On-Star) affect your potential car buying?”

IoT and Healthcare

The July/August Issue of IEEE Internet Computing is focused on applications in Heath care for the Internet of Things (IoT).  This morning, when I hit the Google.com home page, it had a birthday cake — and on “hover” – it wished me a “Happy Birthday Jim” — just in case you were wondering if your Google entry page might be customized for you — the answer is “yes”.   How do these two statements intersect? In some (near term?) future, that page may have suggested I needed to visit a doctor – either because I was searching a combination of symptoms, or because the sensors surrounding me (my watch, cell phone, etc.) indicated problematic changes in my health (or some combination of data from such diverse sources.)

Of course this might be followed by a message that my health insurance was being canceled, or my life insurance.

As this Internet Computing issue points out, there are many benefits to be gained from having a network of sensors that can continuously monitor and provide feedback on health data. The first paper addresses barriers — legal, policy, interoperability, user perspectives, and technological.  The second paper focuses on “encouraging physical activity” and the third paper considers “quality of life (QoL)” (physical health, psychological, social relationships and environment (financial, safety, freedom, …)) It is evident that IoT and health care have many points of overlap – some intended (monitoring devices) and some unintended (search analysis) — and all with significant personal and social impact considerations.

Besides my ingrained paranoia (will Google automatically apply for my retirement beneifts and direct the checks to their accounts?) and delusional optimism (“Your financial QoL is below acceptable norms, we have transferred $1 million into your accounts to normalize this situation – have a good day”) there are pros and cons that will emerge.

What issues and opportunities do you see?

FTC, NoMi and opting out

The U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) settled charges with Nomi Technologies over it’s opt-out policy on April 23rd. Nomi’s business is putting devices in retail stores that track MAC addresses.  A MAC unique MAC address is associated with every device that can use WiFi –it is the key to communicating with your device (cell phone, tablet, laptop, etc.) as opposed to someone elses device.  Nomi apparently performs a hash ‘encryption’ on this (which is still unique, just not usable for WiFi communications) and tracks your presence near or in participating retail stores world wide.

The question the FTC was addressing is does Nomi adhere to it’s privacy policy, which indicates you can opt out in store, and would know what stores are using the technology. Nomi’s privacy policy (as of April 24) indicates they will never collect any personally identifiable information without a consumer’s explicit opt in — of course since you do not know where they are active, nor that they even exist it would appear that they have no consumer’s opting in.  Read that again closely — “personally identifiable information” … it is a MAC address, not your name, and at least one dissenting FTC commissioner asserted that “It is important to note that, as a third party contractor collecting no personally identifiable information, Nomi had no obligation to offer consumers an opt out.”  In other words, as long as Nomi is not selling something to the public, they should have no-holds-barred ability to use your private data anyway they like. The second dissenting commissioner asserts “Nomi does not track individual consumers – that is, Nomi’s technology records whether individuals are unique or repeat visitors, but it does not identify them.” Somehow this commissioner assumes that the unique hash code for a MAC address that can be used to distinguish if a visitor is a repeat, is less of a individual identifier than the initial MAC address (which he notes is not stored.) This is sort of like saying your social security number backwards (a simplistic hash) is not an identifier whereas the number in normal order is.  Clearly the data is a unique identifier and is stored.  Nomi offers the service (according to their web site) to “increase customer engagement by delivering highly relevant mobile campaigns in real time through your mobile app” So, with the data the store (at it’s option) chooses to collect from customers (presumably by their opting in via downloading an app) is the point where your name, address, and credit card information are tied into the hashed MAC address.  Both dissenting commissioners somehow feel that consumers are quite nicely covered by the ability to go to the web site of a company you never heard of, and enter all of your device MAC addresses (which you no doubt have memorized) to opt-out of a collecting data about you that you do not know is being collected for purposes that even that company does not know (since it is the retailer that actually makes use of the data.)  There may be a need to educate some of the folks at the FTC.

If you want to opt out of this one (of many possible) vendors of individual tracking devices you can do so at http://www.nomi.com/homepage/privacy/ .Good Luck.

 

Police Cameras

My daughter is attending a citizen police academy. They discussed the challenges that police cameras (body, squad car, interview rooms, traffic monitoring, etc.) present — and these related, in part, to the objectives of having such cameras.

1) When an officer is apprehending a suspect, a video of the sequence covers a topic that is very likely to be raised in court (in the  U.S. where fairly specific procedures need to be followed during an arrest.)  Evidence related to this has to follow very specific rules to be admissible.  An example of this concept is in the Fort Collins Colorado police FAQ where they provide some specifics. This process requires managed documentation trails by qualified experts to assure the evidence can be used.  There are real expenses here beyond just having a camera and streaming/or transferring the sequences to the web. Web storage has been created that is designed to facilitate this management challenge. Note that even if the prosecution does not wish to use this material, the defense may do so, and if it is not managed correctly, seek that charges be dismissed. (For culture’s where defendants are not innocent until proven guilty and/or there is not a body of case or statutory defendants rights this may sound odd, but in the U.S. it is possible for a blatantly guilty perpetrator to have charges against him dropped due to a failure to respect his rights.)

2) There are situations where a police officer is suspected of criminal actions. For real time situations (like those in the news recently), the same defendants rights need to be respected for the officer(s) involved. Again close management is needed.

Note that in these cases, there are clear criminal activities that the police suspect at the time when the video is captured, and managing the ‘trail of evidence’ is a well defined activity with a cost and benefit that is not present without the cameras.

The vast majority of recorded data does not require the chain-of-evidence treatment. If a proper request for specific data not associated with an arrest results in data that is used in court, it is most likely to be by a defendant, and the prosecutor is unlikely to challenge the validity of the data since it deprecates their own system.

Of course there are other potential uses of the data.  It might contain information relevant to a divorce actions (the couple in the car stopped for the ticket – one’s spouse wants to know why the other person was in the car); or the images of bystanders at a site might impact the apparent privacy of such persons. (Although in general no right of privacy is recognized in the U.S. for persons in public.)

The Seattle police are putting some video on YouTube, after applying automated redaction software to protect the privacy of individuals captured in the frame. Just the presence of the video cameras can reduce both use of force and citizen complaints.

There are clearly situations where either the police, or the citizens involved, or both would find a video recording to be of value, even if it did not meet evidentiary rules.  Of course the concern related to such rules is the potential for in-appropriate editing of the video to transform it from an “objective” witness to bias it in one direction or another.

We have the technology— should we use it?  An opinion piece by Jay Stanley in SSIT’s Technology and Society journal outlines some of these issues in more detail.

T&S Magazine March 2015 Contents

LOW RES T&S March 2015 cover 1

Volume 34, Number 1, March 2015

Special Section on Social and Economic Sustainability

18 GUEST EDITORIAL Jason Sargent, Khanjan Mehta, and Katina Michael

20 Long-Distance Telecommunication in Remote, Poor Areas* Martin J. Murillo, Juan A. Paco, and David Wright

31 Integrated Energy Resources Planning for the Electricity Sector: Targeting Sustainable Development Miguel Edgar Morales Udaeta, Flavio Minoru Maruyama, Andre Luiz Veiga Gimenes, and Luiz Cláudio Ribeiro Galvão

39 The Role of ICT in a Low Carbon Society Michael Koenigsmayr and Thomas Neubauer

45 RFID Individual Tracking and Records Management – Solutions for Slum Communities* Ali Zalzala, Vivienne Strettle, Stanley Chia, and Laura Zalzala

FEATURES

56 An Anticipatory Social Assessment of Factory-Grown Meat* Carolyn S. Mattick, Jameson M. Wetmore, and Braden R. Allenby

65 Resolving Multiplexed Automotive Communications: Applied Agency and the Social Car* Sally A. Applin and Michael D. Fischer

74 Mobile Technology for Socio-Religious Events – A Case Study of NFC Technology* Mohamed Ahmed Mohandes  

DEPARTMENTS

Inside Front Cover ISTAS 2015 – Culture, Ethics, and the Knowledge Society Call for Papers

4 President’s Message SSIT Past and Future Greg Adamson

5 Book Review The Circle

Opinion

7 Ruminations on the “IQ2 Debate: We Are Becoming Enslaved by Our Technology” Jeff Robbins

9 Are Social Media Making Us Stupid? Liz Stillwaggon Swan and Louis J. Goldberg

11 Commentary Considering Social Implications of Biometric Registration – A Database Intended for Every Citizen in India Usha Ramanathan

80 Last Word Lessons from the Sea Christine Perakslis

*Refereed article.

Cover Image: ISTOCK.

T&S Magazine Winter 2014 Contents

T&S Winter 2014 cover low res

VOL. 33, NO. 4, WINTER 2014

DEPARTMENTS
4 PRESIDENT’S MESSAGE
Dear SSIT Members…
Laura Jacob

5 EDITORIAL
Enslaved
Katina Michael

9 LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
Enslavement by Technology? Reflections on the IQ2 Debate on Big Ideas

11 OPINION
Are we Enslaved by Technology?
Michael Eldred

12 LETTER TO THE EDITOR
Excessive Conference Fees

13 BOOK REVIEWS
Lonely Ideas: Can Russia Compete?
Hedy’s Folly: The Life and Breakthrough inventions of Hedy Lamarr, the Most Beautiful Woman in the World
User Unfriendly

21 OPINION
Remotely Piloted Airborne Vehicles
Philip Hall

22 COMMENTARY
Recommendations for Future Development of Artificial Agents
Deborah G. Johnson and Merel Noorman

29 COMMENTARY
Channeling Digital Convergence in Education for Societal Benefit
Arturo Serrano-Santoyo and Mayer R. Cabrera-Flores

32 TRENDS
Influential Engineers: Where Do They Come From and Where Do They Go?
J. Panaretos and C.C. Malesios

35 LEADING EDGE
Videoconferencing for Civil Commitment: Preserving Dignity
Muaid Ithman, Ganesh Gopalakrishna, Bruce Harry, and Deepti Bahl

37 COMMENTARY
Snowden’s Lessons for Whistleblowers
Brian Martin

39 OPINION
How and Why to Keep the NSA Out of Your Private Stuff – Even If You’ve “Got Nothing to Hide”
Katherine Albrecht and Liz McIntyre

42 LEADING EDGE
Using Data to Combat Human Rights Abuses
Felicity Gerry

 FEATURES

44 Leaning on the Ethical Crutch: A Critique of Codes of Ethics*
Jathan Sadowski

48 User Understanding of Privacy in Emerging Mobile Markets*
Cormac Callanan and Borka Jerman-Blazic

57 Questioning Professional Autonomy in Qualitative Inquiry*
R. Varma

65 Cell Phone Use While Driving: Risk Implications for Organizations*
S. Yang and R. Parry

73 Building Trust in the Human—Internet of Things Relationship*
Ioannis Kounelis, Gianmarco Baldini, Ricardo Neisse, Gary Steri, Mariachiara Tallacchini, and Ângela Guimarães Pereira

*Refereed articles.

Cover Image: ISTOCK.